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1. The Question of Death
Human death is shrouded in doubt. The human condition is not only
tormented by pain and by the grad ual breaking-up of the body but also by
the d read of forever ceasing to be. All the aids of technology, however useful
they may be, cannot set our anguished minds at rest. They ma y prolong
life-span or give comfort , but this does not satisfy the heartfelt longing for a
life to come. I
In Gaudium et Spes, the Second Vatican Council explained that while
the mind is at a loss before the mys tery of death , the Church, taught by
divine revelation, declares that God has created man in view of a blessed
destiny which lies beyond the limits of his state on earth:
Moreover, the C hristian faith teaches that bodily dea th . fr o m wh ich man would
have been immune had he n ot sinned. will be overcome when that wholeness which
he lost through hi s own fa ult will be given once again to him by the almighty and
merciful Sa viour. For God has called man, and still calls him. to c leave with a ll hi s
being to him in sharing for eve r a life tha t is Di vine and free from all decay. Christ
won this victory when he rose to life. for b y his dea th he freed man from death 2

The mystery surrounding death has been in some ways deepened by the
advent of the new life support technologies which are able to replace the
function of several vital organs and hence prevent the sudden deterioration
of tissues which normally confirms that death has occurred. At the same
time the questions raised by the capacity of the techn ology lead to the
making of new distinctions, a greater understanding of the mystery of death
and the refinement of traditional teachings .
The definition of death is at once a theological issue. Faith and reason
demand consistency and the Christian definition of death must be
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reconcilable with Christian belief in the resurrection of the body and life
after death .
St. Paul refers to death of the body as a change to the person not the
death of the person:
I will tell you something that has been secret: that we are not all going to die . but we
shall all be changed. This will be instantaneous. in the twinkling of an eye. when the
last trumpet sounds. It will sound. and the dead shall be raised imperishable and
we shall be changed as well. because our present imperishable nature must put on
impehshability and this mortal nature must put on immortality J

Human death is the cessation of a human life, but a full explanation of it
must explain the continuity of the identity of the person through the
profound changes of death.
In this task , theology informs and then is aided by philosophy. The
theological understanding of the human condition and of the resurrection
of the body sets the agenda for the Christian philosopher to seek a
consistent explanation and definition of events. The theologian knows the
promise of resurrection, the philosopher seeks to find the truth about who
he is and how it is that he can undergo the change of human death and still
remain the same person.
The medical practitioner is not a casual observer to this discussion
because the change wrought by death turns his patient into a corpse. The
medical practitioner is required to identify with moral certainty when this
process has occurred. However, his function is only to recognize the
physical changes. The meaning of those changes must be explained and
interpreted in the light of the developing understanding of the Church ,
taught by Divine revelation and guided by its own consistency.
The medical scientist brings to the theologian and the philosopher the
detail of the fruits of research and observation, and thus contributes to the
refinement and development of the Church's teaching. The Church
analyzes technological developments in the light of the Christian concept of
the human person, created by God's love to this image, sustained by the
same Divine love, redeemed by Christ and called to communion with Him
and to share in His happiness.
The matter of defining death is therefore not only a matter for medicine
nor only for theologians and philosophers. Medicine must accurately
inform the latter of the new developments and assess the latter's
explanation in the light of the phenomenon of the circumstances of human
death and the scientific explanation of the physical events.
The theologian and the philosopher, guided by the medical scientist, can
describe various degrees of the breaking-up of the body. However,
establishing with moral certainty the diagnosis of any particular state or
degree of disintegration and disorganization is an entirely medical matter.
The question posed by the developments in medical science which must
be answered by the Church is: At what stage of disintegration and
disorganization can it be said with moral certainty that the human body is
no longer identifiable as the human person.
When we have answered that theological and philosophical question,
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then medical science may determine by what means of diagnosis that stage
of disintegration and disorganization can be recognized with moral
certainty.
The above would therefore suggest a logical sequence:
* Who is the human person? Who is it who is created by God's love to
His image, sustained by God's love, redeemed by Christ and called to
communion with Him and to share in His happiness?
* What is meant by saying that a human death has occurred?
* How may human death be recognized as having occurred?
* How may the bodies of the dead be used?
* What is required to maintain respect for the dead while using the
bodies of the dead for organ transplantation or medical research?
Thus the problem of defining death is resolvable in stages: the definition
of the human person, the definition of the death of the human person, the
medical means of determining that death has occurred , the legitimate uses
of corpses and the pastoral issue of maintaining respect for the dead. Only
after these problems have been resolved is it feasible to consider the issue of
public policy and the legitimacy of so-called "brain-death" legislation.
2. Human Life
The definition of death must account for the change which occurs when a
human life as we know it ceases but, according to Christian belief, at the
same time continues with the same identity.
A simple dualist account has no difficulty in seeing the human person as
soul or spirit merely inhabiting a body in the same way as a captain inhabits
and directs his ship. On that view the spiritual and material worlds are
separate: soul is distinct from body; mind is distinct from matter. 4
On that simple dualist account, death occurs when the soul leaves the
body, and at the beginning of life a person begins when the body is infused
with a soul.
However the issue is more complex. We are embodied and it is as bodies
that we experience creation, that we love, that we know ourselves. The
traditional teaching of the Church is of an interrelatedness of the soul and
the body.
The Church considers the human being both as a personal unity and as a duality of
soul and body. the unity of soul and body is so profound that one must consider
the soul as the "form" of the body (forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter",
says the Council of Vienne, 1312 ... ) ... '

This point is clearly expressed by St. Thomas when he says,
We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is
the form ofthe human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of
the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is
primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is
knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul.
The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing acts
by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body
lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different
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degrees of living things. that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital
functions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment.
sensation. and local movement; and likewise of our u nderstanding. Therefore this
principle by which we primarily understand. whether it be called the intellect or the
intellectual soul. is the form of the body ... •

It is also as a body that we are glorified . 7
... But the body - this is not meant for fornication; it is for the Lord. and the Lord
for the body . God who raised the Lord from the dead . will by his powe r raise us up
too '
... Your body. you know. is the temple of the Holy Spirit. who is in you since you
received him from God. You are not your own property: you have been bought
and paid for. That is why you should use your body for the glory of God ·

An explanation of what it is to be a human person must therefore be
consistent with the concept of a dynamic relationship between the soul and
the body in which the soul is the form of the body; with the continuity of an
identity of the individual through death in which the body is no longer
formed by a soul; and with that same soul being the form of a glorified body
at the resurrection .
That explanation must also be consistent with the constant teaching of
the Church reaffirmed in the Dec/aralion on Procured Aborlion:
From the time the ovum is fertili zed. a new life is begun which is neither that of the
father nor of th e mother. it is rather the life of a new huma n being with his own
growth. It would never be made human if it were not human already . To this
perpetual evidence ... modern genetic science brings valuable confirmation. It has
d emonstrated that. from the first in stant. the programme is fixed as to what this
living being will be: a man. this individual-man with his characteristic aspects
already well determined . Right from fertilization is begun the adventure of a
human life. and each of its great capacities requires time ... to find its place and 10 be
in a position 10 act. ,0

I f we understand St. Thomas then the body owes its nature to the soul.
The completed capacities, the programming. the determination of
development which we now know to be present at fertilization can only be
so because there is a soul. It is the soul which gives the matter its human
form and directs the development of a new human individual.
Yet it is not necessary for that individual to actually instantiate
rationality. The embryo. the fetus . the infant do not yet appear to have
rational thoughts but they have the capacity to develop to a stage of rational
thought.
Upon that capacity rests the classification of a creature made in the image
and likeness of God . Thus at fertilization a new individual is formed , matter
is dynamically organized and integrated into a single individual with the
capacity for rational thought . a being redeemed by Christ and called to
communion with Him .

3. Human Death
The fruit of human generation is sometimes malformed and incapable of
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demonstrate by philosophical argumentation alone. A theological ethic
closes the gap between recognizing the good and the motivation to do the
good. This is particularly important today when self-interest is defended
and even exalted by those who encourage for-profit medicine,
entrepreneurism, competition among health providers, and the commercialization of every facet of medicine. Many physicians today feel
justified ethically in laying aside their moral obligations on the grounds of
survival and exigency. Such a position would be difficult to justify on
grounds of Christian ethics.
Christian theology is based in a Christian humanism that counterbalances the predominantly consequentialist bias of contemporary medical
ethics. This is not to deny the motives of individual consequentialists, nor
even the applicability in certain cases of consequentialist a rguments. But, in
terms of a Christian anthropology, certain acts are intrinsically wrong
whatever their consequences - abortion, direct voluntary or direct
involuntary euthanasia, experimentation with the human embryo, transspecies genetic experimentation involving human genes, surrogate
motherhood and many of the possible permutations and combinations of
modern reproductive technologies.23
Ethics based in a Christian anthropology is the surest safeguard against
the dangers inherent in the biologization of medicine discussed in the
preceding section. It is inconsistent with treating a human being merely as
an organism or an object for experimentation. It opposes any tendency to
base ethics in biology whether behavioristic; sociobiological or psychobiological.
Theological Ethics
Finally, a theologically inspired medical ethics gives meaning to suffering
- something difficult or impossible to demonstrate on philosophical
grounds alone. Thus, it fills a void in modern medicine. It rescues death,
dying, and suffering from the desert of "meaningless" events. Suffering on
the Christian view is a means of atonement, reconciliation, sacrifice, and
example. Its impact on family, friends and community is not without
consequence. Suffering is the final call by Christ to the same via crucis He
traversed for us, and we must traverse for Him and our fellows. The
meanings of suffering cannot be deduced from the formal syllogisms of
philosophic ethics.
Theological ethics bears directly on what it is to be a healer and helper of
the sick. It converts a health career into a vocation, a special kind oflife, and
a way of salvation. 24 It is the health professional's special way to salvation.
That call tempers self-interest and the normal and understandable fatigue,
anger, resentment, and emotional distress which can accompany the
practice of responsible medicine. It tempers, too, the hostility to the noncompliant, self-abusing, sociopathic patients who ca n, at times, try the
patience and charity of even the most conscientious physicia n or nurse.
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of course not conclusive evidence of that existence. When, from empirical
observation and the evidence of many deaths, we can conclude that a stage
is reached where there is no evidence of any unifying organization from that
stage, then we can say, not with absolute certainty, but at least with moral
certainty, that the body no longer lives, the body is a corpse.
The important feature of this account is that the human being is not to be
taken only as ii biological unit, nor can the biological phenomenon we
observe as a living human body be considered in isolation from that which
forms the matter of which it is composed. An essential component of being
a human being is our individuality as persons, not merely as biological
entities. Most human beings are genetically unique, though not all are.
(Identical twins are not.) Nevertheless the human soul is not to be confused
with the body's genetic programming although the genetic programming
would seem to be a consequence of the existence of a human soul.
Personal individuality is much more than mere genetic identity.13 The
latter is a biological phenomenon which does not explain the full unity of
organization nor a spiritual identity, although its purposiveness, dynamism
and form would seem to be indicative of a soul, that which gives form to the
matter.
The human person is not a duality of soul and body, mind and matter, in
the sense in which soul and body might be said to co-exist. Our individuality
is such that we are a unity existing as a single concrete entity.
The soul is one with the body, forming, determining, actuating and organising the
matter to be a human body, including a ll its tissues, organs, limbs and sexuality.
The body is the subject for all our conscious activities and shares in the unique
sense of dignity and value of the human being in every way.l4

For a human being to exist in an embodied way, matter must take on the
individuality of the soul and be organized and integrated into a single,
dynamic entity. The humanity of that entity is in the particular form which
is the organizing, dynamic principle of its integration as a single entity.
Evidently the matter which at one time has the form of a particular
individual can be restructured by or absorbed into another form. The
matter that I am today may later be in the daisies which the cow turns into
milk for my grandson's breakfast!
Life has many forms , but only human life is known to be made in the
image and likeness of God to be redeemed by Him. The tissues and organs
which constitute the human body instantiate the particular form of the
individual person they constitute. The life of each cell is integrated into the
life of the whole person, not essentially by shared genetic identity, but
because they are part of a complete, individual system which is so formed
and activated as to be the kind of being with capacities for specifically
human functions.
Many ofthose cells and organs are capable of an independent life . Blood
cells, kidneys, liver, lungs, heart, etc. , can be kept alive either in culture or in
another body at least for a time. The life of a human cell or a human organ
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is of moral significance in itself only insofar as it is a part of a whole. By
contrast the life of a whole human body is of moral significance in itself, not
because it may be a part of anything else or a member of a community. Each
of us is separately and distinctly made in the image and likeness of God and
individually called by Him to communion with Him.
Thus the value of cells and organs is determined only by their integration
into the whole body of the human individual, even though they may live
after they have been separated from the human body. The soul is
instantiated by the body as a functioning unity, by the organs, tissues, cells
collectively when they function as a single body, each related to the other
parts of the whole and contributing to the dynamism of the whole.
Medical science, in its study of the human person, sees in the human body
a variety of interrelated, mutually dependent systems (circulatory,
respiratory, hormonal, skeletal, neural, digestive, etc.). At the earliest stages
of existence, the human person is yet to develop these systems, but what he
or she has is the capacity to develop them. From the earliest stage of
embryonic development, however, the same organizing, dynamizing,
integrating principle or form exists, shaping what is to come and directing
the activity of what is.
The important feature of a human existence, therefore, is not the
biological systems themselves which constitute the human body, but the
principle or form of which the biological systems and their capacity at every
stage are the instantiation.
Death occurs therefore when the biological systems which constitute the
human body cease to be integrated, dynamized and organized by the life
principle or form which is the human soul. The individual systems may live
as live tissues, and even retain the structures given them by the human soul,
long after the soul has ceased to provide them with the dynamism ,
organization and integration which once gave those tissues the capacity for
human functions as a psychosomatic unity.
Death of the human person is thus not necessarily the death of individ ual
cells, nor the death of particular organs and systems; rather it is the loss of
the organization and integration which give a body its human capacities.
However death is defined , in observing death all we ever have evidence
for is an absence of observable functions . Lack of capacity for human
functions is assumed. It cannot be proven. No one has ever seen a headless
corpse sign its name . It would seem to lack the capacity ever to be able to
sign its name again. The lack of capacity cannot itself be observed , however.
Only the lack of the function itself can be observed.
The determination of death is based upon induction. There are
conditions of the human body from which state no body has ever been
known to recover or attain specifically human functions.
Inductive logic has in some circumstances led to error. Historically, upon
the observation of an absence of vital signs, persons have been pronounced
dead only to recover. Some conditions, such as hypothermia, for instance,
may have suppressed vital signs even though there still exists a capacity for
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recovery. Fear of being buried alive was a common phenomenon of the 19th
century. Coffins were sometimes made with bells which could be rung from
the inside or spring-loaded lids which could be released from the inside. ls
The soul is not a measurable observable substance. Where there are
human functions we can presume that the soul exists as the life principle ,
but where human functions are not apparent, we cannot draw certain
cortclusions. However, inductive logic, ready to be corrected by experience ,
is sufficient for moral certainty. Where no indication of the capacity for
specifically human functions has ever been known to exist we may
legitimately conclude that no human individual exists. When a stage is
reached at which there is a history of empirical evidence that from the stage
no organization and integration necessary for specifically human functions
had ever reappeared , we can conclude that death has occurred .
In an essay in which he attacks the determination of death using the
brain-death criteria , Josef Seifert makes the following observation:
If we prescind from those deepest dimensions of human life which are inseparable
from his transcende nce . however important these may be for a comprehensive
discussion of life a nd death. we can say that the question of human life and death .
as it enters the bioethical discussion and the examination of the criterion of brain
death. moves primarily on two levels . On the one hand . we may indeed. on the
philosophical ground of recognising the spiritual substantiality of the human soul.
define death as 'the separation of body and soul.' It could be understood as a
gradual temporal process in which this separation ,is accomplished or as the last
and definitive moment in which the spiritual subject which is necessari ly
presupposed. above and beyond the brain . for conscious and intellectual acts of
man is no longer bound to the bod y, does no longer vivify the body. is no longer
prese nt in it. Some of those who recognise the existence of a so ul will believe that it
is annihilated in death (as the whole death-theology assumes). others that it is
immortal and still continues to exist after the death of the body. (To this view
corresponds the conviction of another kind of life after death - either in a
no n-incarnated sp iritual form or in a new embodied form.) At any rate, if we can
know philosophically that man must ha ve a soul, we must also maintain as
philosophers . with Plato's Phaidon and the ensuing tradition , that the human
personal life on earth objectivel y begins when the spiritual human soul enters into.
and is present in. the human bod y. that it continues as long as the soul is united
with the body , and that our bodily early life objectively ends at the moment whtn
the human soul leaves definitively the body.'6

I find the notion of a sou l entering into, being present in, the human
body, and leaving it at death , to be an incoherent notion because I cannot
understand how a human body can be in existence at all unless it has been
formed by a soul. The soul does not "enter into" the human body; the soul is
that which forms ' matter into a body, which vitalizes it, which gives it its
capacities for development as a human body. The human bod y as a living
entity is formed by the soul giving human life to mere matter. I concur with
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith when it asks (rhetorically) in
relation to the first appearance of a human life in the form of an
embryo" ... how could a human individual not be a human person?"1 7
How can there be a living human body which is distinct from its soul? The
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body only comes into existence when it is the instantiation of a human soul.
There can be no human organization, integration and d ynamism unless
there is a life-principle, a soul to form , determine, actuate and organize the
matter to be a human body.
Seifert's dualism is too simplistic. The relationship between matter and
form which exists in the embodiment of the human individual is a unity in
which the soul is the form of the body and the latter cannot be as a single
dynamic, integrated organized entity without that which makes it so. The
human body without a soul is not a living human individual at all for it lacks
the unity, the integration and the organization that the soul provides.
A human life comes into existence when a soul gives form to matter and
matter assumes the bodily identity of a being which is organized as a single
individual oriented toward the development of specifically human
functions such as wondering, doubting, affirming, loving, etc. That life is
entirely dependent upon the continued dynamic interaction between matter
and form.
A human life ends not when the soul leaves the body, for that expression
is incoherent. The body is matter instantiating the soul. A human life ends
when the matter, the tissues, organs, etc., which constitute the bod y, cease
to have an organizing integrating principle, that is, when the soul ceases to
give human form to the matter.
When that event occurs individual cells, organs and bodily systems may
continue to have a life of their own but only in a disintegrated way for
nothing actuates them as a single dynamic entity with capacities for
specifically human functions . I concur with Professor Seifert when he says:
"As long as the integrated d ynamic structure of the biological human life of
a human organism as a whole is present, we must assume , at least as highly
probable, that his personal human life is present toO ."1 8
There is , however, a difference between the dynamic interactions of
matter and form which is a living human individual , and the human
organism whose organs keep functioning and interacting in a merely
systemic way without the dynamic and ongoing integration of some form of
control of the system as a whole . The essential dynamic organization and
integration which constitute a living human body are far more than the
bio-mechanical interaction of organs within the body.
An analogy exists between a conceptus which is so damaged that it lacks
the organizing capacity to ever develop the organs necessary for human
functions on the one hand , and on the other, an adult who is so damaged by
disease or trauma that that which brings about organization and
integration does not and never will funct ion again. In the latter case the
organs will have been formed and function and interact in a residual way,
but the organizing capacity which brought about their growth and
development and determined their form and function no longer exists. Such
a being, like the undifferentiated cluster of cells of the malformed
conceptus , is human only in the loose sense of genetic identity. It is without
overall organization. The body has living cells and organs but is not a living
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human body in the important sense of being human, that is, having the
capacity for human functions.
.
Hence it would be possible for death (that is the loss of the organizing and
integrating formation of matter by the soul) to have occurred even though
some organs still functioned and interacted in a systemic way. Residual
function of that kind might well persist even though the capacities which
brought about the development and establishment of these organs and their
interactive functions has ceased to inform the matter of which they are
constituted. That the organs might continue for a time in this way is no
more a problem for determining death than is the fact that individual cells
may live long after a body has started to putrify. Many cells continue to
grow and replicate such as finger nails and hair, bacteria in the gut thrive,
and corneas and bone may be transplanted to another as living tissue even
though circulation and respiration have ceased .
The issue at the heart of the matter is which parts of the whole are
necessary for the whole to retain the ongoing capacity for organization and
integration as a human individual.
This is primarily a question for medical science, but theologians and
philosophers must measure the medical answers against a metaphysical
explanation of the human person. It must not be the case that medicine
adopts a reductionist, materialist concept of the human person , nor an
overly simplistic dualism. Pope Pius XII concluded, in 1957:
Human life continues for as long as its vital functions, distinguished from the
simple life (biologic) of the organs, manifest themselves spontaneously witho ut the
help of artificial processes. The task of determining the exact instant of death is
that of the physician. 19

Evidently the Pope accepted a distinction between the life of the organs
and the life of the individuial. What he meant by "vita l functions", of course,
remains unclear. The state of the technology has altered dramatically since
1957. Many people are able to live for long periods with their vital functions
sustained by art ificial processes. People who live relatively active lives on
ventilators and dialysis machines are instances of this. Whether this is what
the Pope meant when he referred to vitalfunctions manifesting themselves
spontaneously is unclear. There is a sense in which "vital functions" may be
used in which the term refers not to bodily functions such as circulation,
respiration, etc., but to the specific functions which identify and express a
human nature.

4. The Determination of Death
a) Heart-Lung Death
In the past there has been little question that when the heart stopped
beating and breathing ceased permanently, a person was dead. However, as
a matter of pastoral practice, the sacraments were sometimes administered
as much as two hours after cessation of cardio-respiratory function, even
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though Canon Law did not permit the sacraments to be given to those who
were known to be dead. 20 By implication some doubt must have existed as
to the certainty of death even when heart and lung function had
permanently ceased .
The relevance of h~art-lung death is not the cessation of the function of
the orga ns themselves . People do continue to live with artificial hearts , or
with transplanted hearts and lungs even though their own hearts and lungs
have died . What is relevant is the dependence of nearly all the body's organs
and systems on circulation and respiration. Irretrievable cardio-respiratory
arrest clearly indicates a lack of organization and integration. Of course for
a time the organs remain in place with their structure still extant, some
tissues even grow and certainly many of the cells remain in some sense alive.
However, no indication exists for the presence of a life principle. There is no
evidence of on-going organization and integration, for the organs and
tissues rapidly deteriorate and we know empirically that bodies do not
recover human functions after a significant period of cardio-respiratory
arrest.
The importance of irreversible cardio-respiratory arrest as a marker
event for determining death is not that we have reduced our concept of
human life to heart and lung function, but rather that empirically we have
seen no evidence of anyon-going process of organizations and integration
beyond the point at which such arrests occur. We cannot prove that the soul
of a person whose body is in irreversible cardio~respiratory arrest no longer
forms the matter of which the bod y is composed . Nevertheless after that
stage, the disintegration and decomposition which normally occur (that is,
when nothing is done to preserve the tissues) would indicate that the soul no
longer forms , actuates or dynamizes the matter into a functioning human
body.
b) Complete Death of the Brain and Brain Stem
The ability to sustain ventilation , and to control blood pressure,
temperature and electrolyte balances artificially has made the continued
functioning of most of the body's systems possible even after the complete
and irreversible cessation of all brain a nd brain stem functions.
The term "brain death" is inappropriate and mea ns different things to
different people. It is inappropriate because it confuses the issue. The issue
is not whether the brain , as an organ , is alive or dead, but whether the
human individual is dead . That the term "brain death" means different
things to different people is most clearly demonstrated by Professor Seifert
when he writes:
Yet does it foll ow that the brain dea d ma n is dead as ma n? Does it foll ow tha t
growth , metabolism. oxygen accepta nce a nd transfer, most co mplex bi ologica l
steering of pregna ncies, regenerati o n of a ny part of the body, production of new
reproducti ve cells, etc . can occur in an orga n-bank? Is thi s bra n dead man trul y a
"living corpse"? Hardly .
... Now as long as growth of the body as a whole is possibl e, as in children wh o a re
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declared brain dead, one of the fundamental traces of the life of an organism as a
whole is still preserved .
The same applies to nutrition and regeneration and maintenance of the body
through the circulation of oxygen, to nourishment and heart activity. As long as
the process of nutrition and circulation in the "body as a whole" is preserved , even
if one or another single organ is not functioning , the life of the human organism as
a whole cannot be justifably denied .
Even if the mere continued existence of human sperms, and therefore of
procreative functions , is no proof that a human person is alive (which is obvious
for the fact that sperms can also be preserved , under refrigeration , after the death
of a person) , as long as a human organism produces new procreative cells and is in
principle capable of being the origin of the procreation of new human beings , a
profound vital function is still intact which must not be ascribed to a corpse. A
corpse cannot procreate itself. How should it be possible that a corpse still
produced reproductive cells and is capable of the amazing power of giving rise to a
new individual of the same species? Certainly, even if it were conceivable that an
isolated sexual organ is kept alive and continues to produce gametes, it would not
possess the life of a man . Yet we have to consider an extremely important factor for
the determination of human biological life: its 'integrated wholeness'.
It can well be argued that brain dead persons are alive in virtue of the organ
activity and the integrated wholeness of life processes which are associated with
blood and oxygen circulation. As the human body as a whole is kept from
disintegrating, from putrefaction, from collapsing into mere inorganic substances,
as the body-temperature and the processes that are conditions of it, and a number
of other signs of life are still preserved throughout the organism, it seems to be
wrong to declare such a person in irreversible coma dead. There is no sound and
certainly no cogent justification for this ."
.

In these assertions Professor Seifert clearly indicates that in the state he
refers to as "brain death" the human individual is able:
a) to grow (if a child)
b) to maintain its own metabolism
c) to maintain its own oxygen acceptance and transfer
d) to maintain most complex biological steering of pregnancies
e) to regenerate any part of the body
f) to produce new reproductive cells
g) to maintain nutrition
These are not features of a body in which all brain and brain stem activity
has permanently ceased. 22
The growth of a child is hormonally controlled by the release of growth
hormones from the glands located at the base of the brain. These glands do not
function in a bod y which has no brain and no brain stem function .
The metabolism , blood pressure and bod y temperature in a body which has no
brain and no brain stem function must be supported artificially. The vaso-motor
cent re. for instance, is located in the brain stem and it normally maintains tone in
the blood vessels. Without a functioning brain stem the bod y cannot itself
maintain metabolic bala nce, blood pressure and temperature.
Oxygen acceptance and transfer. that is respiration, is done through the means
of a n artificial ventilator for the respiratory centre is located in the brain stem and
hence does not function in a bod y whose brain and brain stem have ceased to
function. The ti ssues of th e lung and the blood cells operate and accept and
tra nsfer oxygen supplied through the mec hanically ventilated lungs .
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Without brain and brain stem function the bod y can not itself maintain the 'most
complex bi o logical steering of pregnancies'. The deve lopment of a pregnancy is
not controlled by the woman's body. The control of a pregnancy in eve n a health y
woman comes not from her but from the fetus and its placenta. The ho rmones
which bring about the specific changes necessary during pregnancy are produced
by the fetus and its placenta. Further. the woman's own hormonal control system
is located at the base of her brain and d oes not function if she has no brain and no
brain stem function .
The production of new reproductive cells is co ntrolled by the hormones released
by the glands located at the base of the brain. Hence in a bod y which has no brain
and no brain stem function no new reproductive cells would be produced.
Nutrition for a bod y without brain and brain stem function must be provided by
artificial means. Digestive and renal function may still occur because these do no t
necessarily require brain function . although electrolyte and other meta bolic
imbalances occur in the absence of the brain and bra in stem function.

Complete and irreversible cessation of brain and brain stem function is
not a condition in which a body can persist indefinitely. Cardiac function
ceases in the majority of cases within 24 horus and , in a large study
involving 500 cases, all went into cardiac arrest within nine days23
Brain death is a state beyond coma and was first characterized "by
complete unresponsivity, lack of spontaneous respiration , flaccidity,
altered thermal regulation, absence of mesencephalic reflexes and
circulatory collapse."24
The condition which Professor Seifert describes is not what is usually
meant by "brain death" in Australia and North America and many other
regions. Rather, the state he describes is a living state between life and death
sometimes referred to as "permanently lost consciousness" or less
sensitively as a "persistent vegetative state".25
Brain death , meaning the complete and irreversible cessation of all brain
and brain stem function, is not a state of equilibrium. The organs and
tissues are being damaged by the lack of control and the resultant systemic
imbalances . The preservation of some systemic function is due to the
artificial intervention provided and the functioning of organs which are not
directly dependent on the brain and brain stem. The body is already in a
state of disintegration ; it has no signs of ongoing organization. The
functions which are left are a remnant of the organizing capacity of the
individual's psychosomatic unity. There is no dynamism. We see only a
collection of organs still interacting and functioning but without the
directed ness, the actuating organizing potency which brings abou the unity
of matter and form we recognize as a human individual. The pathological
evidence shows that the brain tissue of a body with whole brain death has
necrosed . There is a cessation of blood flow to the brain. The state of the
body is akin to that of a body which has been guillotined .26
Like the complete and irreversible cessation of heart and lung function ,
the complete and irreversible cessation of brain and brain stem function is a
state byond which there is no evidence of any body ever recovering any
ongoing process of organization and integration.
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The partial preservation of organ and systemic function which occurs
when all brain and brain stem function has ceased does not indicate any
on-going organization and integration. Hence the complete and irreversible
cessation of brain and brain stem function is a sufficient marker event for a
diagnosis of death to be made with all the implications that death of an
individual has for the family and for the society.
Hence the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical Research would seem to have been correct when
it drew the following conclusions:
On this view . death is that moment at which the body's physiological system
ceases to constitute an integrated whole 21
Nor is there one single characteristic (e .g. breathing. yawning, etc.) the loss of
which signifies death. Rather, what is missing in the dead is a cluster of attributes ,
all of which form part of an organism's responsiveness to its internal and external
environment 28
The death of a human being - not the "death" of cells , tissues or organs - is the
matter at issue. The cessation of vital bodily systems provides the basis for broad
standards by which death can be judged to have occurred. But such functional
cessation is not of interest in and for itself, but for what it reveals about the status of
the person. What was formerly a person is now a dead body and can be socially and
legally treated as such . Although absence of breathing and heartbeat may often
have been spoken of as "defining" death , review of history and of current medical
and popular understanding makes clear that these were merely evidence for the
disintegration of the organism as a whole 29

The modern recourse to the complete and irreversible cessation of brain
and brain stem function would seem to be appropriate in circumstances in
which cardio-respiratory arrest is prevented by artificial means and the
cessation of all brain and brain-stem function is established by appropriate
testing by a physician who makes the diagnosis with reasonable certainty.
There is a variety of ways in which the diagnosis is made . These have
improved and become less complex and more certain as science has
developed. It is not our concern here to analyze what is a very exacting area
of medicine. We do not need to be neurophysiologists to understand the
moral and legal problem. Suffice it to say that we require competent
physicians to make a careful diagnosis that it is a reasonable certainty that
all brain and brain stem functions have permanently ceased.
At St. Vincent's Hospital in Melbourne the diagnosis of death according
to the brain criteria is made by an intensive care physician and a
neurologist, each acting independently. Dr. Ed Byrne, the senior
neurologist at St. Vincent's writes:
The patient must be deeply comatose with no suspicion that this state is due to
depressant drugs. This may require pharmacological tests with drug level screens
in patients who present to Hospital in coma.
Hypothermia must be excluded. A body temperature of less than thirty-five
degrees can lead to depression of brains tern reflexes and the patient's temperature
must be raised above that level before any further testing is carried out. Metabolic
and endocrine disturbances which can either be responsible or contribute to coma
must be excluded.
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The patient must be artificially ventilated because spontaneous respiration has
been inadequate or ceased, and relaxant drugs should have been excluded as a
cause of respiratory failure. Finally, the diagnosis of a disorder which can lead to
brain death must have been fully established and must be of sufficient severity to
account for the clinical findings. A diagnosis of brain death cannot be considered if
the aetiology is in doubt.
The following confirmatory tests are then recommended. Firstly, all brainstem
reflexes are absent. Pupillary responses, corneal responses, gag reflex , vestibuloocular and oculo-cephalic responses must be absent. The patient must be
unresponsive to all stimuli. No respiratory movements must be visible when the
patient is disconnected from the mechanical ventilator for long enough to ensure
that the arterial CO, tension rises above the stimulatory threshold. The procedure
for establishing apnoea is rigorously laid down. The patient must be preventilated
with one hundred percent oxygen for ten minutes and the PaCO, checked to
ensure that it is above 40 mms before the ventilator is disconnected. One hundred
percent oxygen at 6 L j min. must be supplied through a nasal tube during the
period of disconnection from the ventilator to prevent hypoxia. The patient should
be disconnected for approximately ten minutes and the arteria l blood gases ideally
checked at the end of that time to ensure the CO, tension has risen beyond the
stimulatory threshold , arbitrarily taken as 50 mms .
The British criteria do not specify the interval between repetition of testing. If a
massive cerebral haemorrhage, or severe head injury has occurred and remedial
fa ctors have been excluded, a few hours' interval suffices. In the event of a hypoxic
event such as cardiac arrest with resuscitation , at least a day must elapse before
tests are repeated.
The integrity or otherwise of the spinal reflexes is recognised correctly as
irrelevant in these criteria. Confirmatory investigations are not necessary and an
expert neurological opinion is not regarded as essential. The British criteria are
now widely accepted in Australia , and form the basis of the establishment of brain
death in this Hospital. Essentially similar criteria have now been recommended by
the President's Committee on Ethical Problems in Medicine in the United States of
America, with the exception that the role of the electro-encephalogram is left open.
The validity of these criteria was recently challenged in a widely publicised
Panorama programme in the United Kingdom with the result that there was a loss
of public confidence and a massive fall in the number of renal donors. The fear that
a patient still alive but paralysed could be inadvertently disconnected from a
ventilator is a real one in the public mind which can readily be played upon by
sensationalism. None of the cases mentioned in the Panorama programme even
remotely fulfilled the clinical criteria for brain death, but the public furore caused
the medical profession to critically validate the criteria adopted.
Brain death criteria can be validated in two ways. The first is to demonstrate that
brain death invriably leads to classical death within a short period, that is, the heart
stops in spite of every possible supportive treatment. Over a thousand cases who
fu lfilled British Brain Death Criteria have now been ventilated until they
developed cardiac asysto le. In the great majority the heart stopped within a few
days and in all cases spontaneo us asystole followed diagnosis of brain death within
a relatively short period.
It is impossible to maintain an adequate circulation indefinitely in the presence
of a destroyed brainstem. The longest study followed three hundred and twentysix patients diagnosed as being brain dead who were treated intensively after the
diagnosis was made . The mean interval on the venti lator prior to spontaneous
cardiac arres t was only thirty hours. The same group looked at all patients with
very seve re head injuries who surv ived, and found that none had ever met the
criteria for brain death. It is worth making the point that many patients developed
cardiac asystole while the determination of brain death is in progress, especially
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if circumstances dictate a long interval of observation. It can be said with certainty,
therefore, that in any given case, fulfilment of the rigorous clinical criteria
recommended by the British Royal Colleges predicates the irreversible
development of cardiac asystole in the near future.
The second route to verification of the brain death criteria is the pathological
one. If it can be shown that fulfilment of a set of criteria correlates with confluent
necrosis of the br';in at autopsy in all cases, then the criteria are validated.
Mohandes and Chriv, two Minnesota neurosurgeons, studied twenty-five patients
who fulfilled a clinical brain death protocol similar to the British one, and found
that all cases had confluent cerebral necrosis. A larger American collaborative
study, however, concluded that no subset of clinical criteria or specific time for
persistence of the totally non-functional state invariably correlates with
pathological evidence of a 10lally destroyed brain. This is not unexpected as
occasional islands of surviving neurones may presumably be found in a situation
where the mass of the brain has been destroyed , but these have no functional
significance. Furthermore, in studies where patients have been ventilated to
asystole, man y have developed cardiac asystole before neuropathological changes
have had time to develop. It can be said with confidence, however , that all patients
who have developed clinical evidence of brain death and have maintained
rhythmic circulation long enough for neuropathological changes to appear, have
had evidence of massive irreversible brain destruction .
The clinical criteria of brain death suggested by the Royal Colleges have,
therefore, been fully validated by establishing an exact correlation with cardiac
asystole in patients in whom ventilation is continued and by, as far as is possible,
demonstrating neuropathological evidence of severe brain destruction .'o

c) Permanently Lost Consciousness
Permanently lost consciousness denotes a condition between life and death . Such
individuals are not brain dead nor able to return to a cogniza nt life. There is severe
neurologic dysfunction with only minimally persisting brain activity. These
conditions must be excluded from certain medullopontine lesions causing the
so-called locked-in syndrome, or cerebromedullospinal disconnection. In the
latter condition so me mental awareness may be preserved and significant cranial
nerve dysfunction exists but voluntary muscle movements are absent .' 1

Patients in this category (permanently lost consciousness) after a few
weeks become arousable but are unconscious. All higher functions are
absent. They cannot speak , make voluntary movements, exhibit emotions,
or have a memory. They do breathe spontaneously but their responses to
stimuli are primitive only. There is a range of conditions which fall into this
category including so-called persistent vegetative states, (apallic state, coma
vigil, etc.) coma after brain injury or hypoxia with brain-stem function, very
rare cases of end-stage degenerative brain disease (e.g. , Alzheimer's
disease), intra-cranial mass lesions, and anencephaly (congenital brain
hypoplasia).32
These patients apparently lack those functions which are specifically
human functions even though they possess ongoing dynamic organization.
In spite of that organization, they do not function in any observably human
way as individuals. They appear to have no significant cortical or higher
brain activity. Many have been tempted therefore to reduce the criteria for
establishing death to complete cessation of cortical activity even when
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some brain stem function still exists.
Lorna Linda University in California approved a research protocol in
December, 1987 which had the title "Modified Medical Management on
Anencephalic Infants for Organ Donation."33 The Lorna Linda experiment
intensified the debate in which some are calling for the use of anencephalic
infants as a source of organs for transplant purposes.
From the point of view of those who would wish to utilize anencephalic
infants, the problem is that anencephalic infants who are born alive with
usable organs are not born brain dead; they have some brain stem function.
The structural anomalies of the brain stem in infants diagnosed as
anencephalic varies from severe to relatively mild and there is a
corresponding level of dysfunction .34 The removal of organs from
anencephalic infants would, in the eyes of the law, be the removal of the
organs from living persons and hence, be battery, if not murder.
The options for using anencephalics as donors include: waiting for
traditional death, redefining death as cortical death, defining anencephaly
as a special category or abandoning the rule that donors must be dead
before organs are removed.
The Lorna Linda experiment in the first instance involved keeping
anencephalic infants on a ventilator until brain death occurred. However, a
difficulty arose with the protocol in that anencephalic infants on ventilators
actually did fairly well and their condition improved so that brain death did
not eventuate within the time scale first thought. The protocol was
subsequently modified on 15 April 1988 so that ventilation was not
commenced until the infant went into cardiac-respiratory failure ..l 5 In that
way, presumably it was hoped that brain death would be more likely to
occur. That anencephalic infants proved to be so viable increased the
pressure for a change to the definition of death .
It is argued that having made the step to using the whole brain death
criterion, it is but a small step to using the cortical death criterion. In fact.
the logic employed by the Harvard Committee 3" which originally canvassed
the brain death criterion would seem to be that of utility which could easily
be extended to anencephaly, advanced Alzheimer's disease and the other
conditions of permanently lost consciousness:
Th e Committee was explicit as to its utilitarian moti ve: 'Our primary purpose.'
the y began. 'is to define irreversible coma as a new criterion for death.' becau se.
they went on to say. 'o bsolete criteria for the new definition of d eath can lead to
cont roversy is obtaini ng organs for tra nspla ntation.' If reso lution of a controversy
that stand s in th e way was a valid reason for redefining dea th in 1968. why would it
not be a sufficient reason for another definition in 1988')·17

The obvious point to make is that this implies that the definition of death
is determined not by anything which is intrinsic to persons or their corpses,
but according to the uses which may be found . To the contrary, death must
be defined in metaphysical terms. Identifying the events which mark it is a
matter of truth, not utility.
Another proposal is to establish a special category for anencephalics.
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Michael Harrison suggests the phrase "brain absent".38 However, this
would simply be a variation on the theme of altering the concept of brain
death . Such infants would be treated as though brain dead and the phrase
would thus have the same implications.
Finally, Norman FosP9 suggests the possibility of abandoning the rule
that "donors" must be dead . The idea would be to limit the removal of
organs to those patients, such as anencephalics who were not capable of
consciously experiencing harm and who were not capable of having the
capacity for such consciousness restored . The limits could perhaps be
extended to include those with advanced stages of Alzheimer's disease, etc.
The fundamental issue in all of this is the failure to reach agreement on a
definition of human life. However, that failure should not therefore simply
open the way for a utilitarian assignment of a definition for no relevant
reason to do with those declared to be dead, but according to the need for
organs.
On the other hand , the whole brain death criteria, not as a re-defining of
death, but as a more precise way of identifying the disintegration and
disorganization which is the cessation of a human life, is acceptable.
However, much as it may be of great advantage to be able to use organs
from the persistently comatose but not brain dead, including anencephalics,
they remain at least worthy of the benefit of any doubt concerning their
human identity, for they clearly have a degree of integration and
organization. Their bodily systems are subject to central control even
though the nature of the organization present is apparently not sufficient
for them to achieve higher levels of human functions. They are dying but
not dead and warrant the respect we normally accord the dying.
5. Respect for the Bodies of the Dead
Pope Pius XII in 1956 gave his approval to cadaveric organ donations
saying:
A person may will to dispose of his body and to destine it to ends that are useful ,
morally irreproachable and even noble, among them the decision to aid the sick
and suffering. One may make a decision of this nature with respect to his own body
with full realization of the reverence which is due to it. .. this decision should not be
condemned but positively justified 40

The general principles which apply to the use of cadaveric tissue are:
a)

There must be moral certainty that death has occurred.

b) Either the donor must have 'willed' either verbally or in written form
that the tissue might be used for this purpose, or in the absence of the
donor's 'will', his or her relative or close friend expresses the view that the
donor would have been prepared to donate the tissue had the question been
put to him or her.
c) The donation is not opposed by the relatives.
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d) The tissues are not treated in a way which is disrespectful of the dead
person.

6. A Critique of Organ Transplantation
6.1

Sentiment vs. Utility

Most people working within health care do not object on moral grounds
to the brain criteria for death and the donation and transplantation of
organs from such cadavers, and approximately two thirds of the relatives
are willing to consent to organ donation,41 yet assisting in organ
procurement surgery remains unpopular with operating room nurses,
ranking alongside induced abortion in unpopularity.42 Further, although
nurses are, in general, critical of the medical profession , the surgeo ns who
undertake organ procurement seem to be the objects of an unusual amount
of criticism from nurses, often being described as "fast", "aggressive",
" rude", "insensitive", "arrogant", etc.
The latter ma y be due to the "flying squad" character of procurement
teams, the depersonalizing character of a national register, the fact that the
surgeon has usually been called in without prior notice to do the operation,
the haste to collect organs for use in a patient who has been prepared to
receive the organ, the fact that the recipient is often in another hospital and
unknown to the nurses at the salvaging hospital, and so on, but it may also
reflect some dehumanizi ng features of the work of organ sa lvage itself
which is then manifested either in the personalities of surgeons involved in
organ salvage or in the negative feelings on the part of the nurses to the work
being done, in spite of the fact that organ harvesting is ultimately
life-saving.
Nursing attitudes to a procedure and the relationships between nurses
a nd surgeons are not normally proposed as the substance of a moral
argument. However, in the case of cadaveric organ harvesting, moral
argument has been based upon resolving conflicts between sentiment in
relation to the treatment of the bodies of the dead , on the one hand , and the
utility of using the bodies of the dead to save the lives of the living , on the
other. The effect of organ sa lvage on those who undertake the procedures.
the emotive symbolism involved, and whether organ sa lvage is
dehumanizing. were matters of concern in the ethical debates which led to
the adoption of current policies. The resolution of the conflicts in favor of
cadaveric organ transplantation and the passing of legislation enabling it in
most Australian states occurred largely on the basis of the priority of the
need s of the living over se ntiment and sensitivity for the bodies of the dead.
Now. several years after widespread acceptance and adoption of the
practices of determining death by the brain criteria and organ salvaging, is
an appropriate time to review the current situation.

6.2 The Needfor Symbolism
In his essay "The Moral Trap of Sentimentality: The Mistreatment of
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Dead Bodies"43 Joel Feinberg discussed three major arguments defended by
William May44 based on sentiment or sensitivity: the argument that the
offended sentiment is essential to our humanity, the argument from
institutional symbolism and the argument that the threatened sensibility
has great utility. Reflection on those old arguments in the light of current
practices leads me to the view that there is a need for symbolism and ritual in
order to direct the sensitivities offended by organ salvage and the whole
brain criteria for determining death in such as way as to prevent the
hardening and coarsening of the attitudes of those routinely involved in
organ salvage and to assist in the grieving of relatives.
In 1972 William May argued that there is a connection between human
dignity and a capacity for horror, and he re-affirmed that view in 1985.
The cadaver is a kind of shroud that masks rather than expresses the soul that
once animated it. Yet while the body retains a recognizable form , even in death , it
commands the respect of identity. No longer a human presence, it still reminds us
of that presence that once was utterly inseparable from it.
.. . Proposals .. .for the dismemberment of the corpse, even if that dismemberment
serves important social purposes such as organ transplants, awaken a deep-going
reservation . This reservation grows out of an aversion, a shuddering, before the
harsh treatment of a corpse 4 S

May does not however argue that the sense of horror and the deep
reservation one naturally has in relation to the dismemberment of a corpse
should outweigh the benefits to be attained by organ transplantation . He
agrees with Feinberg 46 in holding that such sentiments should be disciplined
and directed .47
The problem is not so much whether to undertake organ salvage but the
manner in which it occurs and the disciplining and direction of natural
sentiments such that involvement in the activity is not dehumanizing. The
negative attitude of operating room nurses to organ salvage and the
surgeons who undertake it rings alarm bells in relation to the manner of
collecting organs and the treatment of the sensitivities of those involved.
This concern is not confined to nursing and medical staff. Being present
at the moment of death and being with the body immediately after death are
significant happenings in the course of a relative's grief and are of great
emotional consequence in the personal acceptance of the loss.
The circumstances of beating heart organ salvage deprive relatives of the
normal opportunity to see the body at rest after the battle for life is over.
The final chapter when respiration is ceased and the heart stops beating
happens in the secret and often bizarre realm of the operating room while or
just after organs are removed. Although it is true that death has occurred
when the brain completely and irreversibly ceases to function , death by
brain criteria alone convinces only at a rational level. While a relative or
spouse breathes and the heart beats, it is difficult to relinquish emotional
hold on a body which appears so alive, however convincing the evidence of
complete and irreversible cessation of brain function. The relatives of a
beating heart donor make their farewells not to the still remains lying in
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the curiously peaceful repose of death, but to a departing trolley with its
dead but breathing offering animated, so to speak, by the technology.
Once through the opaque swinging doors of the operating room , the
atmosphere is very different. For there the procurement team carries out
business as usual , all action and controlled hurry against a background of
the exchange of stories of the week-end away and the doings of teenage kids.
Later the dissected and depleted remains will be wheeled unseen to the
mortuary for disposal by the undertaker.
What is missing in all of this is the ritual and symbolsim by which we
normally humanize death . Death in this case is not the dramatic event of the
cessation of respiration, but a doctor's diagnosis and his signing of a form.
The release of the beating heart body to the procurement team is
accompanied by neither ceremony nor ritual and the members of the team
remain faceless , as though like scavenging ghouls hidden in the anonymity
and secrecy of the operating room awaiting the rattle of the trolley and its
human package of precious organs.
Organ salvage for the purposes of transplantation is of great benefit to
individuals suffering from illnesses which can be treated in this way. Renal
transplantation, for instance , is considered the optimal treatment for
patients with end stage renal disease because it provides better levels of
health and well-being and a greater likelihood of enabling successful
employment. It is also the least expensive , since the cost of maintaining
transplanted patients is only one-third that of the cheapest form of
dialysis. 48
The lives of the living are more important than horror and revulsion , and
emotion, grief and sentiment for the dead . Consequently, organ salvage
should not be foregone simply because it makes grief more difficult and is
contrary to sensitivities and sentiments in relation to respect for the bodies
of the dead.
Rather, the problem is the tendency of current practices to dehumanize
the process. There are strong feelings and emotions at stake which need to
be recognized and directed.
In this respect , the churches have been extraordinarily remiss . At an
official level, the churches have largely ignored the development of organ
salvage from beating heart cadavers . The practice has neither been accepted
nor rejected , and no ceremonies have been developed to mark the
significant event which occurs when a family consents to donation. There
are not special prayers, no liturgies, no rituals by which to direct the
emotion energy toward recognizing and understanding the symbolism of
the gift of organs so that another may have life , nor a religious event to mark
the acceptance of the death of a relative.
There is, in this reality, a challenge to the churches to explore the concept
of institutionalized symbolism in relation to cadaveric organ donation.
This is also a challenge to hospitals to review the practice of organ salvage
in order to humanize it. Perhaps the procurement team should meet with
the relatives of the donor. Perhaps a representati ve of the relatives of the
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donor should be permitted to accompany the body to the operating room
should he or she wish to do so.
It is a serious mistake for all concerned to ignore the fact that organ
salvage offends natural sensitivities. Ignoring those sensitivities is at the cost
of dehumanizing the process and coarsening the attitudes of those routinely
involved. It should be possible to acknowledge the sensitivities and to
provide opportunities to channel them by ritual and ceremony so that the
emotional energy is directed in ways which are helpful to the understanding
and acceptance of the reality of the events.
The development of symbolic means of directing the emotional
sensitivities would be of benefit to transplant programs. Relatives would be
more likely to donate in the event that the process was more humanized.
Applied to the salvaging and transplantation of human tissue,
traditionally the concepts of giving and receiving have been considered
better than the concepts of taking and getting.49 In Australia, the concepts
of buying and selling human tissue are culturally unacceptable and that
rejection is expressed in law. It is a criminal offense in all Australian states
to trade in human tissue, including regenerative tissue such as blood. 50
The concepts of giving and receiving offer the best context for directing
sensitivities. The voluntary gift of the organs of a deceased relative preserves
dignity and respect in contrast to routine salvaging.
Hospitals and churches could seek to develop some alternative rituals for
the recognition and acceptance of death according to the whole brain
criteria and the voluntary transfer of the body by the relatives from the
treating team to the team responsible for organ salvage, thus marking the
change in direction of treatment which occurs with the pronouncement of
brain death. Ceremony and ritual could also be developed to symbolize the
expression of the emotional significance of foregoing the ordinary
completion of the laying out of a dead person and instead offering the
organs for salvage so that others may have life.

7. Death and the State
Different states have enacted a variety of legal definitions of death. In
Australia the common definition is:
For the purposes of the law in this State, a person had died where there has
occurred:
a) irreversible cessation of circulation of blood in the body of the person; or
b) irreversible cessation of all function of the brain of the person .

There are a number of advantages in defining death in this way:
a) The definition permits a judicial determination of the ultimate fact of death .
The latter is necessary for the operation of many areas of law especially the law
relating to inheritance and property and the homicide law.
b) The definition permits a medical determination of the evidentiary fact of
death. The circulation of the blood and the activity of the brain and brain stem are
phenomena which can be assessed with reasonable certainty by competent medical
practitioners.
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c) The definition does not prescribe the medical criteria which are to be used .
Thus as medical knowledge and expertise develop, it can be applied to diagnosis of
the brain functions or circulation of the blood.
d) The definition would seem to avoid euthanasia. It excludes those who have
permanently lost consciousness, but does seem to include all those who can be said
with reasonable certainty to have died .
e) The definition can operate in both the civil and the criminal law.

The State has an obligation to intervene in this area. To quote the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:
For this reason the new technological possibilities which ha ve opened up in the
field of biomedicine require the intervention of the political authorities and of the
legislator, since an uncontrolled application of suc h techniques could lead to
unforeseeable and damaging consequences for civil society. Recourse to the
conscience of each individual and to the se lf-regulation of researchers cannot be
sufficient for ensuring respect for perso nal rights and public order. If the legislator
responsible for the common good were not watchful, he could be deprived of his
prerogatives by researchers claiming to govern humanity in the name of the
biological discoveries and the alleged "improvement" processes which they would
draw from those discoveries. 'Eugenism' and forms of discrimination between
human beings could come to be legitimi zed: this would constitute an act of
violence and a serious offense to the equality, dignity and fundamental rights of the
human person .ll

This was said in relation to reproductive technology, but it would seem to
apply equally to the new developments in intensive care medicine and to the
development of organ transplantation from "beating heart" donors,
Of grave concern is the danger that ignorance of the medical
determination of death and the absence of clear moral teaching will lead to
the widespread belief that the value of human life is being compromised and
that the dying but not dead are being utilized for organ donations, In a
climate of acceptance of the practice of euthanasia, this is a real danger.
Governments and medical authorities have a grave obligation to explain
what is happening and to ensure that new developments do not occur at
such a pace that common understanding of the application of moral
principles lags behind to the moral confusion of many and the creation of
scandal.
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